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PUNISHMENT AND PROTECTION—THE
DISQUALIFICATION OF DIRECTORS IN SINGAPORE
Madhavan Peter v. Public Prosecutor1
Ong Chow Hong (alias Ong Chaw Ping) v. Public Prosecutor2
Pearlie Koh∗
I. Introduction
The ability to operate behind the shield of the corporate form, thereby benefitting from
limited liability, is thought to be a privilege3 conferred by statute.4 This privilege is
however, curtailed for certain individuals who are “proven misfits”.5 The removal, by
disqualification, of these individuals from corporate management is intended to pro-
tect the shareholders and creditors of the companies concerned from the possibility
of future instances of undesirable conduct by these same individuals. Thus, the Com-
panies Act6 of Singapore provides for disqualification from holding directorships or
from management of a company on a number of grounds.7 Disqualification may be
automatic8 or dependent on a court making a disqualification order.9 There is also
recognition that disqualification is punitive. Indeed, the effect of a disqualification,
∗ Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, Singapore Management University.
1 [2012] 4 S.L.R. 613 (H.C.) [Madhavan Peter].
2 [2011] 3 S.L.R. 1093 (H.C.) [Ong Chow Hong].
3 For a consideration of the difference between treating this as a privilege or as a right, see Vanessa Finch,
“Disqualifying Directors: Issues of Rights, Privileges and Employment” (1993) 22 Indus. L.J. 35.
4 Justice Lightman, “The Challenges Ahead: Address to the Insolvency Lawyers’ Association” [1996]
J. Bus. L. 113 at 125.
5 Ibid. See also Kingsley T.W. Ong, “Disqualification of Directors: A Faulty Regime?” (1998) 19 Company
Lawyer 7.
6 Cap. 50, 2006 Rev. Ed. Sing.
7 Undischarged bankruptcy (s. 148); unfitness (s. 149); directorship in companies wound up on grounds
of national security or interest (s. 149A); conviction for certain offences (s. 154); persistent default of
delivery of documents to the Registrar (s. 155); and disqualification under the Limited Partnership Act
(Cap. 163B, 2010 Rev. Ed. Sing.), s. 155A.
8 For, inter alia, an undischarged bankrupt (ibid., s. 148), or a person who has been convicted of certain
offences involving fraud or dishonesty (ibid., s. 154(1)).
9 For, inter alia, “unfit directors of insolvent companies” (ibid., s. 149) and any person who has been
convicted in Singapore of offences related to the management or formation of companies (ibid., s. 154(2)).
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given its “substantial interference with the freedom of the individual”,10 is at least
quasi-penal.
This vacillating characterisation has led to decisions, not only from Singapore,11
but also from England12 and Australia, which have variously emphasised either or
both the protective and punitive underpinnings of the regime. The importance of
developing a coherent rationale for the disqualification of directors should not be
underestimated. The statutory objective informs the court as to the applicable and
relevant considerations, not only when assessing the appropriateness and extent of a
disqualification order, but also when deciding whether to grant the affected person
leave from the disqualification. This punitive-protective ambivalence has recently
been seemingly resolved in Singapore by the High Court. In two recent and related
cases,13 the court concluded that the objective of the disqualification regime was
not punitive, but was essentially protective in nature. This notwithstanding, a closer
examination of the judgments demonstrates that the court did take account of punitive
considerations in arriving at the final decision. Indeed, it is questionable whether a
purely protective principle can exist in the context of the disqualification regime. The
position may well be, as McColl J.A. accepted in the Court of Appeal of New South
Wales, that the disqualification scheme admits of an essentially hybrid nature.14 In
that light, therefore, the punitive-protective dichotomy may be a “false” one.15
II. The Cases
Both cases involved Airocean Group Ltd, formerly a public listed company. The
Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) of the company was being investigated for cor-
ruption by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (“CPIB”). Airocean’s board
of directors was aware of the investigations, having been so informed by the CEO
when he was released on bail. On the basis of legal advice, however, the board
decided that nothing further needed to be done at that point in time. News of the
CPIB probe was published in the newspapers some two months hence. This led
to the Singapore Exchange seeking clarification on the matter. An investigation by
the Commercial Affairs Department into alleged contraventions of the disclosure
10 Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd [1988] Ch. 477 at 486. Indeed, the consequences go beyond the individual,
as the company’s reputation, operations and relations are also likely to be adversely affected: Robert
Baldwin, “The New Punitive Regulation” (2004) 67 Mod. L. Rev. 351 at 362. See also Re Crestjoy
Products Ltd [1990] B.C.C. 23 (Ch.); R. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, ex parte McCormick
[1998] B.C.C. 379 at 386 (C.A.).
11 For an emphasis on the ‘punitive’ aspect of disqualification, see e.g., Lee Huay Kok v. A.G. [2001] 3
S.L.R.(R.) 287 (H.C.) [Lee Huay Kok]. See also Public Prosecutor v. Sng Keng Ling [2008] SGDC
344; Public Prosecutor v. Peter Moe [2008] SGDC 343; Public Prosecutor v. Lim Kiang Soon [2008]
SGDC 342; Public Prosecutor v. Lee Siew Hoe [2008] SGDC 341; Public Prosecutor v. Lee Thian Soon
[2008] SGDC 340. For an emphasis on the ‘protective’ aspect, see e.g., Lim Teck Cheng v. A.G. [1995] 3
S.L.R.(R.) 223 (H.C.); Yap Guat Beng v. Public Prosecutor [2011] 2 S.L.R. 689 (H.C.).
12 See generally Vanessa Finch, “Disqualification of Directors: A Plea for Competence” (1990) 53
Mod. L. Rev. 385; Finch, “Disqualifying Directors: Issues of Rights, Privileges and Employment”,
supra note 3.
13 Madhavan Peter, supra note 1; Ong Chow Hong, supra note 2.
14 Rich v. Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] 203 A.L.R. 671 at para. 344
(N.S.W.C.A.) (McColl J.A., dissenting), rev’d [2004] 220 C.L.R. 129 (H.C.A.) [Rich (HCA)].
15 Ibid.
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provisions in the Securities and Futures Act16 followed. In Ong Chow Hong, the
earlier decision, Ong, the non-executive chairman of Airocean’s board of directors,
was charged for breach of s. 157(1)17 of the Companies Act in connection with his
conduct following the Singapore Exchange’s request for clarification on the CPIB
probe. When the company secretary contacted Ong by telephone to inform him that
the Exchange had requested for a clarification statement in response to the newspaper
report, Ong responded that “he would agree to any announcement issued by [Airo-
cean] if [Madhavan] approved of it… because he was going to play golf that day”.18
Madhavan, a practising lawyer, was an independent director on the company’s board,
who was himself charged for disclosure offences in the second decision here under
consideration. Ong did not see the draft announcement before it was released. He
pleaded guilty and was fined and also disqualified from managing the affairs of
any company for a period of 12 months. Ong appealed against the disqualification
order. The High Court held that Ong “had committed nothing short of a serious
lapse in entirely abdicating his corporate responsibilities”.19 In the circumstances,
V. K. Rajah J.A. dismissed the appeal and extended the period of disqualification to
24 months.
In Madhavan Peter, three directors, including Madhavan and Chong, the Chief
Operating Officer, were separately charged for, and found guilty by the District
Court of, infringing the disclosure provisions of the SFA in respect of the failure
to notify the Exchange of the investigations. In addition, Chong was convicted
of insider trading, having sold three lots of Airocean shares during the relevant
period. All three directors were, in addition to penalties imposed under the SFA,
disqualified for varying periods under s. 154(2) of the Companies Act.20 The directors
appealed against their convictions. The High Court acquitted the directors of the
disclosure charges, but upheld Chong’s insider trading convictions, reducing the
custodial sentence imposed by the District Court to a fine. The period of Chong’s
disqualification from acting as a director was however sustained at the original five
years. Chan Sek Keong C.J. held that five years was not manifestly excessive as
Chong had “abused his office as a director to trade in Airocean shares using inside
information which he had acquired qua director”.21 This was, in Chan C.J.’s view,
a transgression that was far more serious than Ong’s.
III. Punishment and Protection—A False Dichotomy?
Rajah J.A.’s judgment in Ong Chow Hong provides one of the most reasoned expo-
sitions by the High Court on the rationale of Singapore’s disqualification regime,
16 Cap. 289, 2006 Rev. Ed. Sing. [SFA].
17 Companies Act, supra note 6, s. 157 obliges company directors to “at all times act honestly and use
reasonable diligence in the discharge of the duties of his office”. A director in breach of s. 157 is guilty
of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to an imprisonment term: ibid., s. 157(3).
18 Ong Chow Hong, supra note 2 at para. 9, referring to the agreed statement of facts [emphasis omitted].
To be fair to Ong, the golfing event was an official event at which Ong had a prominent role to play.
19 Ibid. at para. 28.
20 Companies Act, supra note 6, s. 154(2) provides as follows: “Where a person is convicted in Singapore
of (a) any offence in connection with the formation or management of a corporation… the court may
make a disqualification order in addition to any other sentence imposed.”
21 Madhavan Peter, supra note 1 at para. 190.
450 Singapore Journal of Legal Studies [2013]
which is premised on the statutory provisions of England22 and Australia.23 His
Honour observed that, although protection was initially the “overarching object”
of disqualification in all three jurisdictions,24 each jurisdiction had embarked on
“different regulatory paths”.25 In the case of both the U.K. and Australia, the dis-
qualification regimes there had developed such that they were respectively presently
driven by considerations which went beyond protection. Singapore, on the other
hand, had, in Rajah J.A.’s view, remained on the protective path, a view with
which Chan C.J. concurred.26 Rajah J.A. disagreed with Choo Han Teck J.C. (as
he then was), who had opined in Lee Huay Kok that “there [was] a strong, if
not predominant, punitive element”27 in the disqualification provisions. Rajah
J.A. considered Choo J.C. to have “departed from the original protective basis…
[which] departure [sat] uneasily with the statutory structure of the disqualification
regime”.28
A. Consideration of the English Position
Rajah J.A. began with a consideration of the English regime. English company law
had long provided for the disqualification of company directors.29 The powers vested
in the court to make disqualification orders were expanded and consolidated in the
CDDA.30 As Rajah J.A. noted, it had generally been judicially accepted31 that the
U.K. disqualification regime was developed to protect the public, especially poten-
tial creditors of companies. This notwithstanding, English decisions had included
deterrence and punitive considerations in the making of disqualification orders under
the CDDA. In Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Griffiths, Re Westmid Pack-
ing Services Ltd (No. 3),32 Lord Woolf M.R. explained the reason for adopting this
22 The modern incarnation of which is found in the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (U.K.),
1986, c. 46 [CDDA].
23 The present provisions are found in Corporations Act 2001 (Cth.), Part 2D.6.
24 Ong Chow Hong, supra note 2 at para. 13.
25 Ibid.
26 Madhavan Peter, supra note 1 at para. 189.
27 Lee Huay Kok, supra note 11 at para. 10.
28 Ong Chow Hong, supra note 2 at para. 19.
29 Originally by virtue of the Companies Act, 1928 (U.K.): see generally L.H. Leigh, “Disqualification
Orders in Company and Insolvency Law” (1986) 7 Company Lawyer 179.
30 The CDDA, supra note 22, s. 11, prohibits undischarged bankrupts from acting as directors. The court
may make disqualification orders where a director has been convicted on indictment of certain offences:
ibid., s. 2; where there have been persistent breaches of the companies legislation: ibid., s. 3; where
there has been fraudulent or wrongful trading: ibid., ss. 4, 10. In addition, the court must mandatorily
disqualify a director of an insolvent company for 2 years if the court is satisfied that his conduct as a
director of that company renders him “unfit to be concerned in the management of a company”: ibid.,
s. 6. Section 6 is often considered the most important provision under which disqualification orders may
be made: see Derek French, Stephen Mayson & Christopher Ryan, Mayson, French & Ryan on Company
Law, 29th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at para. 20.13.2.5; Brian R. Cheffins, Company
Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 549, and has been
described as “the state’s weapon of choice”: see Richard Williams, “Disqualifying Directors: A Remedy
Worse than the Disease?” (2007) 7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 213 at 215.
31 See e.g., In re Sevenoaks Stationers (Retail) Ltd [1991] Ch. 164 at 176 (C.A.).
32 [1998] B.C.C. 836 (C.A.).
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position:33
[T]here are occasions when disqualification must be ordered even though, by
reason of the director’s recognition of his previous failings and the way he has
conducted himself since the conduct complained of, he is in fact no longer a danger
to the public at all. In such cases it is no longer necessary for the director to be
kept ‘off the road’ for the protection of the public but other factors come into play
in the wider interests of protecting the public, i.e. a deterrent element in relation to
the director himself and a deterrent element as far as other directors are concerned.
Despite the fact that the courts have said disqualification is not a ‘punishment’, in
truth the exercise that is being engaged in is little different from any sentencing
exercise. The period of disqualification must reflect the gravity of the offence. It
must contain deterrent elements. That is what sentencing is all about, and that is
what fixing the appropriate period of the disqualification is all about.34
Thus, in considering the period of disqualification to impose,35 the U.K. courts have
adopted a “backward-looking”36 assessment. The focus on the past, which echoes
the punitive tradition of retribution and desert,37 has been criticised as involving
“unnecessary and inappropriate confusion”.38 This criticism is not without merit.
Focusing on the blameworthiness of the director’s conduct, which takes account of
individual mitigating factors, may, paradoxically, result in the director not being
disqualified, or being disqualified for a shorter term, even where protective consider-
ations may demand otherwise. The English decision of Re Cladrose Ltd39 provides
a useful illustration.40 There, the directors of three insolvent companies had failed
entirely to produce accounts for auditing, and to file annual returns. One of the direc-
tors, Pollard, had relied on the other, Platt, who was a qualified chartered accountant.
The court disqualified only the chartered accountant, holding that Pollard was “very
much less blameworthy… [as] it can be said [he] relied upon somebody whom [he]
had good and sufficient cause to believe was a proper person to rely upon, and who
was equally with [himself] responsible”.41
From a protective vantage point, however, it should at least have been arguable that
the public deserved to be protected against directors, regardless of their individual
33 Ibid. at 843.
34 See also In re Grayan Building Services Ltd (in liquidation) [1995] Ch. 241 (C.A.).
35 It should be noted that CDDA, supra note 22, s. 6 imposes a minimum disqualification period of 2 years:
s. 6(4).
36 Paul L. Davies, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern Company Law, 8th ed. (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 2008) at 243.
37 Frederic R. Kellogg, “From Retribution to ‘Desert’: The Evolution of Criminal Punishment” (1977) 15
Criminol. 179 at 182, citing Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments (New York:
Hill and Wang, 1976).
38 Finch, “Disqualifying Directors: Issues of Rights, Privileges and Employment”, supra note 3 at 42;
cf. Sally E. Wheeler, “Re Sevenoaks—Continuing the Search for Principle” (1990) Insolvency Law &
Practice 174 at 175. For a view that disqualification should be concerned less with such concepts than
with corporate governance generally, see Alice Belcher, “What Makes a Director Fit? An Analysis of the
Workings of Section 17 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986” (2012) 16 Ed. L. Rev. 386.
39 [1990] B.C.L.C. 204 (Ch.) [Re Cladrose].
40 See also Finch “Disqualification of Directors: A Plea for Competence”, supra note 12 at 388; Finch,
“Disqualifying Directors: Issues of Rights, Privileges and Employment”, supra note 3 at 37.
41 Re Cladrose, supra note 39 at 208.
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qualifications or expertise, who had a propensity to abdicate their responsibility for
matters which were by law within the purview of all directors.42 This seems all
the more so as the court took a serious view of the importance of proper company
administration.43 As Harman J. himself noted, the obligation to prepare accounts and
make annual returns was “a matter which is the duty of all directors to deal with”.44
Protective considerations should therefore have seen Pollard also disqualified.
The approach taken in Re Cladrose vis-à-vis Pollard was in sharp contradistinc-
tion to the approach taken by Rajah J.A. in Ong Chow Hong. Rajah J.A. had
considered it “imprudent”45 to accept Ong’s contention that he had relied on a
professionally-qualified co-director as “[e]very director has to ensure that he dis-
charges his responsibilities with due diligence in all pertinent matters”.46 Rajah
J.A. clearly had the protective rationale firmly in mind when he stated pointedly:47
[E]ven if I were to accept that [Ong] was under a mistaken apprehension of the
severity of the circumstances… such a fact in my view would be a contention that
worked against [Ong]. If he could not even perceive the severity in such palpable
circumstances, it seemed to me that he should all the more be kept away from
such directorship positions where perceptive judgments are fundamental.
However, Rajah J.A.’s approach cannot be said to be entirely without punitive con-
siderations either. Rajah J.A. had indicated a preparedness to accept that Ong’s
transgression was a “one-off incident”.48 Had purely protective principles been
applied, this factor should have meant that the need for protection was spent, given
that the need for personal deterrence is low or even absent. Disqualification would
be strictly unnecessary. His Honour however made the following observations:49
[T]he court must also appropriately calibrate the punishment in order to deter sim-
ilar irresponsible conduct. It ought to be made plain that the courts will not be slow
to disqualify directors for substantial periods of time if and when it is established
that there have been serious lapses in the discharge of their responsibilities.
In this respect, interestingly, Rajah J.A.’s approach approximated Harman J.’s vis-à-
vis Platt, the accountant-director. Harman J. had considered Platt more blameworthy
because as a chartered accountant, he had “exhibited an unwarrantable disregard,
an unwarrantable lightness of view, as to the seriousness of keeping the registrar
informed”.50 Platt was accordingly disqualified even though he was by then not a
company director, and was unlikely, in the opinion of Harman J., to become one in
the future.51 Like Ong, Platt was no longer someone from whose actions the public
required prospective protection. The fact that he was disqualified anyway cannot
therefore be justified purely on protective grounds.
42 See also Finch, “Disqualification of Directors: A Plea for Competence”, supra note 12 at 389.
43 Re Cladrose, supra note 39 at 207, 214.
44 Ibid. at 213.
45 Ong Chow Hong, supra note 2 at para. 33.
46 Ibid. at para. 34 [emphasis in original].
47 Ibid. at para. 30.
48 Ibid. at para. 35.
49 Ibid. [emphasis added].
50 Re Cladrose, supra note 39 at 214.
51 Ibid.
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It would appear, in the final analysis, that Rajah J.A.’s treatment of Ong’s dis-
qualification did introduce a significant punitive element. It may be, however, that
such a hybrid approach is necessary, in order to achieve the fullest protection for the
public.
B. Consideration of the Australian Position
Rajah J.A. also considered disqualification under the Australian Corporations Act
2001,52 which provides for a number of grounds53 on which both automatic disqual-
ification, as well as disqualification upon the exercise of the discretion to disqualify
vested in the court,54 may occur. His Honour stated that disqualification was “used
uniquely inAustralia as a civil penalty”.55 As the civil penalty regime was introduced
as a “statutory replacement for criminal sanctions… intended to provide a reduced
form of ‘punishment”’,56 his Honour opined that “it was natural for the Australian
courts to articulate punitive objects underlying disqualification orders”.57 It is indeed
the case that Australian courts do not take protection as the “sole purpose”58 of a
disqualification order. In Rich (HCA),59 to which his Honour referred, the majority
of the Australian High Court held that the privilege against exposure to a penalty
applied to proceedings that sought a disqualification order because such proceed-
ings, even if brought to protect the public, could also bear penal consequences.60
The court observed that the punitive-protective divide is erroneous as it assumed that
the categories are mutually exclusive when they were not. McHugh J. was more
explicit. Echoing similar sentiments as those expressed by Lord Woolf M.R., he
stated as follows:61
Despite frequent statements by the judges who administer the legislation that the
purpose of the disqualification provisions is protective, what the judges actually
do in practice is little different from what judges do in determining what orders
or penalties should be made for offences against the criminal law. Elements of
retribution, deterrence, reformation and mitigation as well as the objective of the
52 Supra note 23.
53 See generally Robert P. Austin & Ian Ramsay, eds., Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, 15th
ed. (Dayton: Lexis, 2012) at c. 7.
54 The Australian Securities and Investments Commission may also disqualify a person from being involved
in the management of corporations on the basis of a liquidator’s adverse report on the corporation’s ability
to pay its debts: Corporations Act 2001, supra note 23, s. 206F.
55 Ong Chow Hong, supra note 2 at para. 15 [emphasis added].
56 Ibid. It appears that Rajah J.A. may have been partially influenced by the term “penalty” in “civil
penalty” to be persuaded that a disqualification order made for breach of a civil penalty provision is
therefore punitive. Kirby J., who delivered a dissenting judgement in Rich (HCA), supra note 14, was of
the contrary view that “the noun (penalty) is less important than the adjective (civil)”: Rich (HCA), ibid. at
para. 98. In contrast, the majority in Rich (HCA) described the expression “civil penalty provisions”
as “a convenient description for a disparate group of provisions” and considered the reference to civil
consequences as being inconclusive as to whether the proceedings are penal: Rich (HCA), ibid. at para. 22.
57 Ong Chow Hong, ibid. at para. 15.
58 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v. Vizard [2005] FCA 1037 at para. 35 (Finkelstein J.).
59 Supra note 14.
60 Ibid. at para. 35.
61 Ibid. at para. 41.
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protection of the public inhere in the orders and periods of disqualification made
under the legislation.62
It should, however, be noted that this position was adopted in relation to disqual-
ifications generally, and not, with respect, because of the civil penalty regime as
such. The civil penalty regime is essentially a separate regime from disqualifica-
tion.63 The link between the two regimes is found in s. 206C of the Corporations
Act 2001, which provides one of several grounds upon which the court may make
an order for disqualification. This section empowers the court to order that a per-
son in breach of a “corporation/scheme civil penalty provision” be disqualified from
managing corporations if such disqualification is “justified” and for such period as
the court deems appropriate.64 A “civil penalty provision” is one that falls within a
list provided in s. 1317E of the Corporations Act 2001. The list includes provisions
relating to directors’ and officers’ duties generally, as well as obligations imposed
with respect to related party transactions, financial statements, and insolvent trad-
ing. Thus, a director who breached his statutory duty to exercise care and diligence,
as enshrined in s. 180(1) of the Corporations Act 2001,65 would, in addition to
being subject to the specific orders66 that may be made for that contravention, be
liable to be disqualified under s. 206C. Section 206C is, therefore, very similar to
s. 154(2) of the Companies Act. As we saw earlier, s. 154(2) permits the court to
disqualify a person who is convicted in Singapore of, inter alia, an offence under
s. 157. This latter section, in a similar manner to s. 180(1) of the Corporations
Act 2001, enshrines Singapore’s statutory duty of reasonable diligence for directors.
An important distinction however is that contravention of s. 157 is an offence.67 In
contrast, a contravention of a civil penalty provision is not a crime, and civil penalty
proceedings are, by statutory requirement,68 subject to civil rules of evidence and
procedure. By parity of reasoning therefore, if it is “natural”69 to articulate punitive
objects when the act underlying disqualification was a civil penalty, it would, with
respect, be so a fortiori when the underlying act is a criminal offence. As such, it
may not be entirely persuasive to distinguish Australian authorities purely on this
basis.
62 See also Elliot v. Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] 10 V.R. 369 at para. 137
(Vic. S.C.A.).
63 See generally Austin & Ramsay, supra note 53 at para. 3.390.12ff.
64 Corporations Act 2001, supra note 23, s. 206C.
65 Ibid., s. 180(1) provides as follows:
A director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers and discharge their duties with
the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would exercise if they:
(a) were a director or officer of a corporation in the corporation’s circumstances; and
(b) occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the corporation as, the
director or officer.
66 Breach of a civil penalty provision permits the court to make a “declaration of contravention”. Con-
sequent upon that order, the court may make a “pecuniary penalty order” of up to AU$200,000: ibid.,
s. 1317G(1). Additionally, the court may make a compensation order, whether or not it makes a declaration
of contravention: ibid., s. 1317H.
67 Companies Act, supra note 6, s. 157(3).
68 Corporations Act 2001, supra note 23, s. 1317L.
69 Ong Chow Hong, supra note 2 at para. 15.
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C. Thick and Thin
Rajah J.A. went on to develop the concept of protection that underpinned the dis-
qualification regime.70 In his view, protection may be specific (or ‘thin’) or general
(or ‘thick’). The ‘thin’ aspect of protection, upon which the cases had tended to
focus, served to protect the public from the acts of the specific individual. The
‘thick’aspect of protection, on the other hand, served to “generally protect the public
from all errant directors by an uncompromising reaffirmation of the expected exem-
plary standards of corporate governance”.71 This form of protection was “expressed
through the appropriate calibration of disqualification orders assessed to be sufficient
to deter serious lapses in corporate behaviour”.72 Ong was, at the relevant time, a
director of a listed company. The regulation of capital markets in Singapore shifted
more than a decade ago from a merit-based system to a disclosure-based regime that
depended on the reliability and integrity of market communications for its efficient
operation. It was therefore very important that transgressions which compromise or
threatened to compromise the integrity of the market be dealt with firmly. Accord-
ingly, the ‘thick’aspect of protection demanded a sufficiently lengthy disqualification
period that would signal unambiguously the court’s intolerance of such irresponsible
conduct.
It should be immediately apparent that the ideals behind Rajah J.A.’s ‘thick’
protection are very similar to those that drive punitive regulation. Punitive regulation
in general is often justified on the basis, inter alia, of its deterrent or preventive
effect.73 According to deterrence theorists, punishment is efficient if it “maximizes
social welfare”,74 and the efficiency of a punishment is assessed on account both
of “general deterrence”, which refers to the wider societal impact the punishment of
an offender has in general, and of “specific deterrence”, which refers to the effect of
the punishment on the offender’s own individual behavior.75 Rajah J.A.’s ‘thin’ and
‘thick’ aspects of protection echo these ideas closely.
IV. Conclusion
Protective considerations clearly underpin the disqualification regime in Singa-
pore. The question is whether this should necessarily exclude a co-existent punitive
underpinning. As the above discussion shows, Rajah J.A.’s treatment of Ong’s dis-
qualification was not independent of punitive considerations. And in Madhavan
Peter, it was the degree of Chong’s blameworthiness, a punitive factor, that Chan
C.J. relied upon to affirm the five-year disqualification period.
Perhaps classification of disqualification proceedings is simply unnecessary, and
perhaps the Singapore court ought to recognise that the twin goals of protection and
punishment can co-exist and are not mutually exclusive. Punishment, after all, is
70 Ibid. at paras. 22-25.
71 Ibid. at para. 23.
72 Ibid. at para. 24.
73 See generally Johannes Andenaes, “The General Preventive Effects of Punishment” (1966) 114
U. Pa. L. Rev. 949; Dan M. Kahan, “The Secret Ambition of Deterrence” (1999) 113 Harv. L. Rev. 413.
74 Dan M. Kahan, ibid. at 425.
75 Ibid.
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not necessarily inconsistent with protective aims,76 and proceedings brought with
the aim of protecting the public or some segment thereof could concurrently pun-
ish the person against whom those proceedings were brought. Much is determined by
the particular disqualification provision and the context of the application before the
court.
76 One theory of punishment is incapacitation, which is based on the idea that society should be protected
against persons of “dangerous disposition… acting upon their destructive tendencies”: Kent Greenawalt,
“Punishment” (1983) 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 343 at 352. See also Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan &
Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Malaysia and Singapore, 2nd ed. (Singapore: LexisNexis, 2012)
at 56.
